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Abstract 
Milenage algorithm applies the block cipher Rijnadael (AES) with 128 bit key and 128 bit block size. This 
algorithm is used in the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions (f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*) for 
mobile  communication  systems  (GSM/UMTS/LTE).  In  this  paper  a  modification  of  Milenage  algorithm  is 
proposed through a dynamic change of S-box in AES depending on secret key. To get a new secret key for 
every authentication process we add the random number (RAND) transmitted from the authentication center 
(AUC) to the contents of the fixed stored secret key (Ki) and thus the initialization of the AES will be different 
each new authentication process . For every change in secret key a new S-box is derived from the standard one 
by  permuting  its  rows  and  columns  with  the  help  of  a  new  designed  PN  sequence  generator.  A  complete 
simulation  of  modified  Milenage  and  PN  sequence  generator  is  done  using  Microcontroller  (PIC18F452). 
security analysis is applied using Avalanche test to compare between the original and modified Milenage . Tests 
proved that the modified algorithm is more secure than the original one due to the dynamic behavior of S-box 
with every change of the secret key and immunity against linear and differential cryptanalysis using Avalanche 
tests.  This  makes  the  modified  Milenage  more  suitable  for  the  applications  of  authentication  techniques 
specially for mobile communication systems.                     
Keywords—Authentication  vector  (AV),  Modified  MILENAGE  Algorithm  for  AKA  Functions 
(F1,F1*,F2,F3,F4,F5,F5*), AES ,Dynamic S-BOX and  PN Sequence Generator(LFSR). 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Authentication  includes  the  authenticity  of 
the subscriber as well as the network. Authentication 
of  mobile  subscribers  and  network  operators  is  a 
challenge  of  future  researchers  due  to  increasing 
security threats and attacks with the enhanced volume 
of wireless traffic. Authentication schemes in mobile 
communication  systems  are  initiated  during  IMSI 
attach,  location  registration,  location  update  with 
serving  network  change,  call  setup  (MOC,  MTC), 
activation  of  connectionless  supplementary  services 
and short message services (SMS).  
Milenage  algorithm  is  used  for  generating 
authentication  and  key  agreement  of  cryptographic 
generating functions (MAC, XRES, CK and IK). The 
main  core  of  Milenage  algorithm  is  the  Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) [1] which launched as a 
symmetrical cryptographic standard algorithm by the 
National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) 
in October 2000, after a four year effort to replace the 
aging DES. The Rijndael proposal for AES defined a 
cipher in which the key length can be independently 
specified to be 128 , 192 or 256 bits but the input and 
output block length is 128 bits.[2],[3].Four different 
stages  are  used  in  AES  :Sub  Byte  transformation, 
Shift Rows, Mix Columns and Add Round Key.  For  
 
both  encryption  and  decryption,  the  cipher  begins 
with  an  Add  Round  Key  stage,  followed  by  nine 
rounds that each includes all four stages, followed by 
a tenth round of three stages.[4]. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  In 
Section  II,  authentication  schemes  in  mobile 
communications  are  described.    In  Section  III,  a 
proposed  authentication  scheme  is  presented 
depending on the dynamic change of S-box in AES , 
the new Secret key for every authentication process 
and the new PN sequence generator. In Section IV, a 
complete  simulation  of  the  modified  Milenage 
algorithm  and  the  Avalanche  test  results  are 
introduced.  Discussions  and  Conclusions  are 
presented in Section V.  
 
II.  AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES IN  
MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS. 
(i)   GSM/GPRS Authentication and     Key 
Agreement vectors . 
There exists a permanent, shared secret key 
Ki for each subscriber. This permanent key is stored 
in two locations: in the subscriber’s SIM card and in 
the Authentication Centre (AuC). The key Ki is never 
moved  from  either  of  these  two  locations. 
Authentication of the subscriber is done by checking 
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that  the  subscriber  has  access  to  Ki.  This  can  be 
achieved by challenging the subscriber by sending a 
random 128-bit string (RAND) to the terminal. The 
terminal  has  to  respond  by  computing  a  one-way 
function with inputs of RAND and the key Ki, and 
returning the 32-bit output Signed Response (SRES) 
to the network. Inside the terminal, the computation of 
this one-way function, denoted by A3, happens in the 
SIM  card.  During  the  authentication  procedure,  a 
temporary session key Kc is generated as an output of 
another one-way function A8. The input parameters 
for A8 are the same as for A3: Ki and RAND. The 
session  key  Kc  is  subsequently  used  to  encrypt 
communication  on  the  radio  interface.  The  serving 
network does not have direct access to the permanent 
key Ki, so it cannot perform the authentication alone. 
Instead,  all  relevant  parameters,  so  called  the 
authentication triplet (RAND, SRES and Kc) are sent 
to  the  serving  network  element  Mobile  Switching 
Centre/Visitor  Location  Register  (MSC/VLR)  (or 
Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) in the case of 
GPRS) from the AuC. [5], [6].  
 
(ii) UMTS/LTE/Advanced LTE Authentication and 
Key Agreement  Vectors. 
. UMTS Generation of Authentication vectors 
(Quintets) in the AUC. 
Upon the receipt of the authentication data 
request from the VLR/SGSN, The HLR/AuC sends an 
authentication response back to the VLR/SGSN that 
contains an ordered array of n authentication vectors 
AV(1..n).  The  HLR/AuC  starts  with  generating  a 
fresh  sequence  number  SQN  and  an  unpredictable 
challenge  RAND.  The  authentication  vectors  are 
ordered based on sequence number. [5]. 
There are eight Cryptographic functions used 
in    UMTS/LTE/Advanced  LTE  Authentication  and 
Key  Agreement  to  generate  Authentication  vector 
(AV). f0 is the random challenge-generating function. 
It  should  be  a  pseudo  random  number-generating 
function and map the internal state of the generator to 
the challenge value RAND , the length of RAND is 
128  bits.  The    f1  is  the  network  authentication 
function,  f1*  is  the  re-synchronization  message 
authentication  function,  it  is  used  to  provide  data 
origin  authentication  for  synchronization  failure 
information sent by the USIM to the AuC, f2 is the 
user  authentication  function,  f3  is    the  cipher  key 
derivation function , f4 is  the integrity key derivation 
function, f5 is the anonymity key derivation function 
for  normal  operation  and  f5*  is  the  anonymity  key 
derivation function for re-synchronization, f5* is only 
used  to  provide  user  identity  confidentiality  during 
resynchronization. K is the subscriber authentication 
key stored in the USIM and at the AuC, The length of 
K is 128 bits. [5],[7],[8]. 
To  generate  authentication  quintuple,  the 
HLR\AUC computes a message authentication code 
for  authentication  MAC-A=  f1k  (SQN  ||  RAND  || 
AMF), the length of MAC-A is 64bits. an expected 
response XRES = f2k (RAND), the length of XRES is 
64bits.. a cipher key CK = f3k (RAND). the length of 
CK is 128bits . an integrity key IK = f4k (RAND) the 
length of IK is 128bits and an anonymity key AK = 
f5k (RAND), the length of AK is 48bits that is used to 
conceale sequence number SQN, the length of SQN is 
48bits, SQN= SQN ⊕ AK. the HLR/AuC aggregates 
the authentication token AUTN = SQN [⊕  AK] || 
AMF(16bits)  ||  MAC-A,  the  lengths  of  AUTN  is 
128bits  that  forms  the  quintet  Q  =AV=  (RAND, 
XRES, CK, IK, AUTN). [7], [8], [9]. 
 
.  Authentication and key derivation in the 
         USIM.  
Upon  receipt  of  a  (RAND,  AUTN),  the 
USIM  computes  the  anonymity  key  AK  =  f5k 
(RAND)  and  retrieves  the  unconcealed  sequence 
number SQN = (SQN ⊕AK) ⊕ AK, XMAC-A = f1k 
(SQN  ||  RAND||  AMF),  the  response  RES  =  f2k 
(RAND), the cipher key CK = f3k (RAND) and the 
integrity key IK = f4k (RAND) as shown in fig.2. [5], 
[6].   
 
 
K 
SQN 
RAND 
f1  f2  f3  f4 
f5 
XMAC  RES  CK  IK 
AK 
SQN  AK  AMF   MAC 
AUTN 
Verify MAC = XMAC 
Verify that SQN is in the correct range 
 
 
Figure1. Authentication and key derivation in the 
USIM.[7]. 
 
(iii)  LTE\AdvancedLTE  Generation  of 
Authentication Vectors  in the HSS. 
The LTE architecture is built on the existing 
architecture  from  UMTS.  LTE  standards  reuse  the 
authentication  and  key-agreement  of  UMTS.  The 
LTE/Advanced LTE AKA protocol also known as the 
Evolved  Packet  System  (EPS)  AKA  protocol.  The 
EPS-AKA protocol is executed between UE and the 
MME  instead  of  between  the  USIM  and  the 
VLR/SGSN. The AuC generates UMTS AVs for EPS 
AKA in exactly the same format as for UMTS AKA. 
The HSS part outside the AuC derives KASME from 
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local master key KASME and an AUTN] as shown in 
fig.1. [10], [11], [12]. 
 
AUTN           = [SQN ⊕ AK || AMF || MAC]. 
UMTS (AV) = [RAND || XRES || CK || IK || AUTN]. 
EPS     (AV) = [RAND || XRES || KASME|| AUTN]. 
Figure2. Generation of UMTS and EPS authentication 
vectors. [6]. 
 
III.  Proposed Authentication Scheme in 
Mobile Communication. 
A  modification  of  Milenage  algorithm  is 
proposed through a dynamic change of S-box in AES 
depending on the new secret key. To get a new secret 
key  for  every  authentication  process  we  add  the 
random  number  (RAND)  transmitted  from  the 
authentication  center  (AUC)  to  the  contents  of  the 
fixed stored secret key (Ki) and so, the initialization of 
the  AES  will  be  different  for  each  authentication 
process. For every change in secret key a new S-box 
is  derived  from  the  standard  one  by  permuting  its 
columns and rows with the help of a new designed 
PN  sequence  generator.  Finally  to  get  a  strong 
Milenage algorithm generating all functions  f1, f1*, 
f2, f3, f4, f5, and f5* and the outputs of the various 
functions  used  in  User  Authentication,  Network 
Authentication, Data Integrity Check and Ciphering 
data. The outputs of the various functions are then 
defined as shown in fig.3.  
  Output  of  f1  =  MAC-A,  where  MAC-A[0]  ..     
MAC-A[63] = OUT1[0] ..   OUT1[63]  
  Output  of  f1*  =  MAC-S,  where  MAC-S[0]  .. 
MAC-S[63] = OUT1[64] .. OUT1[127]  
  Output of f2 = RES, where RES[0] .. RES[63] = 
OUT2[64] .. OUT2[127]  
  Output of f3 = CK, where CK[0] .. CK[127] = 
OUT3[0] .. OUT3[127]  
  Output  of  f4=  IK,  where  IK[0]  ..  IK[127]  = 
OUT4[0] .. OUT4[127]  
  Output  of  f5=  AK,  where  AK[0]  ..  AK[47]  = 
OUT2[0] .. OUT2[47]  
  Output of f5* = AK, where AK[0] .. AK[47] = 
OUT5[0] .. OUT5[47]  
 
Figure 3. Computation of the MILENAGE functions. 
[13]. 
 
Upgrade of S-box (Dynamic S-box) depends 
on  the  new  secret  key  (Key⊕RAND)  for  every 
authentication  process  and  the  new  PN  Random 
sequence  generator[14]  .  The  suggested  generator 
consists  of  three  Maximal  length  Linear  Feedback 
Shift Register (LFSR) with thirty two, seventeen and 
fifteen taps. The period of this PN sequence= (2
32-1) 
(2
17-1)  (2
15-1)  the  1
st  128  bits  of  the  PN  sequence 
generator is taken as the secret key to upgrade the s-
box. The 1
st 64
 bits to rearrange the columns and the 
2
nd 64 bits to rearrange the rows of original S-box. The 
feedback functions of the LFSRs are: [15]. 
 LFSR 1:  F1=X
15+X
14 +1 
 LFSR 2:  F2=X
32+X
22+X
2+X+1
 
 LFSR 3 : F3= X
17+X
14 +1 
To  initialize  the  PN  sequence  generator  as 
shown fig.4, the new secret key is divided into two 
vectors of 64 bit length that are XORed to produce the 
initial state of the PN sequence generator (64bits). Let 
the fixed stored authentication key Ki = [9E5944 AE 
A94B8116  5C82FBF9  F32DB751]  and  the  RAND 
=[CE83DBC54AC0274A157C17F8D017BD6],  the 
new  secret  key  =  Ki⊕RAND  =[50DA9 
F6BE38BA65C49FEEC01FE2CCC87].  
The initialization vector of the PN sequence 
generator  (reshaped  new  secret  key  ) 
=[50DA9F6BE38BA6  5C]⊕[49FEEC01FE2CCC87] 
= [1924736A1D A76ADB]. The 1
st  64 bits of the PN 
sequence  generator  will  be  [09AE48DBC37F5612] 
used to rearrange columns of S-box and the 2
nd 64 bits 
of the PN sequence generator will be[B9DE60C327 
458F1A] to rearrange the rows of S-box to have the 
final modified form. 
 
Figure 4.  PN random sequence generator. 
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Table 1.  AES standard  S-BOX. 
 
 
Table 2.  For COLUMN Dynamic S-box after 
                arrangement = [09AE48DBC37F5612]. 
 
 
Table3.  Final  S-box  ROWs  after  arrangement 
=[B9DE60C327458F1A]  that  used  in  Modified 
Milenage  Algorithm  during  the  new    secret  key  to 
generate  a  new  s-box  so  called  [Dynamic  Key  (S-
box)]. 
 
 
IV.  SIMULAION AND RESULTS 
A  complete  simulation  of  the  modified 
Milenage algorithm is achieved using Microcontroller 
(PIC18F452). The Avalanche tests are introduced to 
compare between the original and modified milenage. 
 
(i)  For AES standard – 128  
Plain text = [CF574710 2773651A6E238818 
A27CB9EF],  Secret  Key=[885C3649  B840D9E0 
06D061F5F6FC6046]  and  Cipher  Text  = 
[B218A58FA18EB4B764737D51 83378B4E]. 
 
(ii)  For Modified AES-128 
[Dynamic S-box] using PN sequence random 
generator. Reshaped Secret Key 64 bit= [8E8C57BC 
4EBCB9A6],  Column  dynamic  S-box  after 
arrangement  =  [6093B714F2AEDC58]  and  final 
dynamic S-box ROWs after arrangement = [A14FC 
8D65B09E372]. 
   
Table 4. Modified AES (Dynamic S-box) – 128. 
Plain text    =     CF 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 23 
88 18 A2 7C B9 EF 
Secret Key  =     88 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 D0 
61 F5 F6 FC 60 46 
Cipher Text = 38 B1 4D 2A 56 81 2F 13 FF EE 38 
69 FA A4 77 40  
 
(iii) Avalanche test 
 
Table 5. Results of Avalanche test due to change one 
bit in plain text in standard AES. 
Changed one bit (1) 
Plain text =                4F 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EF  
Cipher Text=             23 B0 6F 4D 38 93 19 64 B4 
DD 8A DE 7A 16 0A BC  
Difference  value = 91 A8 CA C2 99 1D AD D3 
D0 AE F7 8F F9 21 81 F2                       
Ratio=51.56% 
Changed one bit (15) 
Plain text =                CF 55 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EF  
Cipher Text=             51 75 5C B4 E9 B5 FD AF 
C1 CA F3 FE F5 B4 5E E2  
Difference  value = E3 6D F9 3B 48 3B 49 18 A5 
B9 8E AF 76 83 D5 AC                       
Ratio=53.90% 
Changed one bit (69) 
Plain text =                 CF 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 66 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EF  
Cipher Text=             9F BB 05 72 7E 08 28 23 77 
DE 80 21 2B 68 A1 BA  
Difference  value = 2D A3 A0 FD DF 86 9C 94 13 
AD FD 70 A8 5F 2A F4                      
Ratio=53.90% 
Changed one bit (115) 
Plain text =                 CF 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C 99 EF  
Cipher Text=             DC 7F 25 84 3F 5D 38 46 73 
86 0E 3B F7 54 AB 09  
Difference  value = 6E 67 80 0B 9E D3 8C F1 17 
F5 73 6A 74 63 20 47                        Ratio=50.00% 
Changed one bit (128) 
Plain text =                 CF 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EE  
Cipher Text=             8B B7 62 9E 65 73 58 29 38 Zakaria Zakaria Hassan et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications   www.ijera.com 
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A0 2E C9 42 CE DB F9  
Difference  value = 39 AF C7 11 C4 FD EC 9E 
5C D3 53 98 C1 F9 50 B7                        
Ratio=54.68% 
 
Table 6. Results of Avalanche test due to change one 
bit in plain text in modified AES. 
Changed one bit (1) 
Plain text              = 4F 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EF  
Cipher Text          = A6 3B 8A BD B0 84 37 EA 
BF 7E F5 A4 1D 8F F9 0C  
Difference Value = 9E 8A C7 97 E6 05 18 F9 40 
90 CD CD E7 2B 8E 4C     Ratio=49.21% 
Changed one bit (15) 
Plain text             = CF 55 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EF  
Cipher Text           = 5F EC 44 96 1B C5 F4 36 
52 F2 E4 72 5E 25 22 9B  
Difference Value = 67 5D 09 BC 4D 44 DB 25 
AD 1C DC 1B A4 81 55 DB                     
Ratio=50.00% 
Changed one bit (69) 
Plain text              = CF 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 66 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EF  
Cipher Text           = 3B E8 CF 4F 38 2C 25 26 
C1 7E B7 B1 4C 9F 81 C7  
Difference Value = 03 59 82 65 6E AD 0A 35 3E 
90 8F D8 B6 3B F6 87                        
Ratio=50.00% 
Changed one bit (115) 
Plain text              = CF 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C 99 EF  
Cipher Text          = 70 F7 F4 7C 5D AD FE E1 
08 02 F4 13 1C 2E DE 62  
Difference Value = 48 46 B9 56 0B 2C D1 F2 F7 
EC CC 7A E6 8A A9 22                        
Ratio=50.00% 
Changed one bit (128) 
Plain text              = CF 57 47 10 27 73 65 1A 6E 
23 88 18 A2 7C B9 EE  
Cipher Text          = E6 58 E8 C3 91 53 46 B6 
CA F4 A9 BC 6C A2 D8 56  
Difference Value = DE E9 A5 E9 C7 D2 69 A5 
35 1A 91 D5 96 06 AF 16                       
Ratio=52.34% 
 
Table 7. Samples of Avalanche test due to change one 
bit in Secret Key of AES-128 standard. 
Changed one bit (1) 
Secret key           = 08 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text         = 06 90 6A 74 99 D1 28 4C 74 
C5 B7 D4 BB 8A 3B C3  
Difference value = B4 88 CF FB 38 5F 9C FB 
10 B6 CA 85 38 BD B0 8D                        
Ratio=53.12% 
Changed one bit (2) 
Secret key           = C8 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text         = B3 3B 73 D4 77 9C F5 CB 
B5 0A DD FB 4F 27 70 47  
Difference value = 01 23 D6 5B D6 12 41 7C 
D1 79 A0 AA CC 10 FB 09                       
Ratio=44.53% 
Changed one bit (16) 
Secret key           = 88 5D 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text         = C7 43 E5 6C 4C D6 65 F1 
60 31 D9 43 E5 0D 0E 65  
Difference value = 75 5B 40 E3 ED 58 D1 46 04 
42 A4 12 66 3A 85 2B                        
Ratio=42.96% 
Changed one bit (99) 
Secret key           = 88 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 D6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text         = CB 67 F2 A1 C9 4D B7 21 
C0 06 A1 4C DC D6 9B 05  
Difference value = 79 7F 57 2E 68 C3 03 96 A4 
75 DC 1D 5F E1 10 4B                         
Ratio=51.56% 
Changed one bit (128) 
Secret key           = 88 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 47  
Cipher Text         = 5D F7 E1 35 B8 9D 17 77 
68 17 02 CB 12 EF 61 33  
Difference value = EF EF 44 BA 19 13 A3 C0 
0C 64 7F 9A 91 D8 EA 7D                        
Ratio=52.34% 
 
 
Figure 5. Avalanche effects of AES standard due to 
change one bit in Secret Key. 
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Table 8. Samples of Avalanche test due to change one 
bit in Secret Key of Modified AES. 
 Changed one bit (1) 
Secret key            =  08 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text          =  10 8D DA 81 C6 9C 0A F1 
70 58 10 9A 79 04 08 07  
Difference value =  28 3C 97 AB 90 1D 25 E2 8F 
B6 28 F3 83 A0 7F 47                      Ratio = 
49.21% 
Changed one bit (2) 
Secret key            =  C8 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text          =  7A 0F EA 22 23 2A 1B 89 94 
8B 23 16 02 A8 6A 74  
Difference value =  42 BE A7 08 75 AB 34 9A 6B 
65 1B 7F F8 0C 1D 34                     Ratio = 
50.78% 
Changed one bit (16) 
Secret key            =  88 5D 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text          =  80 D1 05 BD 8B A4 40 40 6C 
05 28 36 A2 8B 0C F1  
Difference value =  B8 60 48 97 DD 25 6F 53 93 
EB 10 5F 58 2F 7B B1                     Ratio = 
52.34% 
Changed one bit (99) 
Secret key            =  88 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 D6 FC 60 46  
Cipher Text          =  4A 6C 51 DC 6D B9 99 13 69 
B3 72 43 21 7E C3 E6  
Difference value =  72 DD 1C F6 3B 38 B6 00 96 
5D 4A 2A DB DA B4 A6                  Ratio = 
51.56% 
Changed one bit (128) 
Secret key            =  88 5C 36 49 B8 40 D9 E0 06 
D0 61 F5 F6 FC 60 47  
Cipher Text          =  00 A6 7B 81 86 50 04 40 94 
5E 64 9A 0F 57 18 03  
Difference value =  38 17 36 AB D0 D1 2B 53 6B 
B0 5C F3 F5 F3 6F 43                     Ratio = 
54.68% 
 
 
Figure 6. Avalanche effects of Modified AES due to 
change one bit in Secret Key. 
 
 Table 9. Result Outputs of Modified  MILENAGE 
Algorthim to derive a stronger Authentication Vector 
(AV)  than  Output  of  standard  Milenage  Algorthim  
(Authentication Vector) in 3GPP. [16], [17].  
Key  9E5944AE A94B8116 5C82FBF9 
F32DB751  
RAND  CE83DBC54AC0274A 157C17F8 
D017BD6  
Dynamic 
Key   
50DA9F6BE38BA65C49FEEC01FE
2CCC87 
SQN  0B604A81 ECA8  
AMF  9E09  
OP  223014C5806694C0 07CA1EEE 
F57F004F 
OPC  1B3D2E3E625213D9BC49DBC552
BCDE 4C 
TEMP   
C8B662E237F3E58D24E7B5A96D2
C2C9F 
OUT1  BA328BB5831B71029111AC8D2332
E862 
OUT2  13DD09518BE63818E23EDE87AC 
73F109  
OUT3  EF3523C87886D0637FD2B501D02
E3BA2 
OUT4  0FE930F07931B15882B88BEB4F4D
E654 
OUT5  93A92189A493A876B8F1801A9F8A
B8C3 
F1(MAC-
A) 
BA328BB5831B7102 
F1*(MAC
-S) 
9111AC8D2332E862 
F2(RES)     E23EDE87AC73F109 
F3(CK)      EF3523C87886D0637FD2B501D02
E3BA2 
F4(IK)      0FE930F07931B15882B88BEB4F4D
E654 
F5(AK)  13DD09518BE6 
F5*(AK)     93A92189A493 
AUTN  18BD43D0674E9E09BA328BB5831
B7102 
 
 
AV 
CE83DBC54AC0274A157C17F80D
017BD6E23EDE87AC73F109EF352
3C87886D063EF3523C87886D0637
FD2B501D02E3BA20FE930F07931
B15882B88BEB4F4DE65418BD43D
0674E9E09BA328BB5831B7102 
 
V.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
(i)  The main weakness in Milenage, as stated by the 
Cryptanalysts,  is  the  use  bit  rotations  and  constant 
XORs in the middle part of the milenage specially if 
the  kernel  block  cipher  in  milenage  algorithm  is 
susceptible  to  differential  cryptanalysis,  then  an 
attacker is capable to proceed a variety of attacks on 
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milenage  algorithm.  An  attacker  cannot predict any 
useful  information  if  the  kernel  block  cipher  in 
milenage algorithm is a strong secure. 
This  paper  modifies  the  standard  Milenage 
Authentication algorithm through the dynamic change 
of  the  kernel  block  cipher  AES.  For  every 
Authentication process a new S-box will be generated 
using  a  combination  of  received  random  sequence 
number (RAND), stored Authentication key (Ki) and 
PN sequence generator to rearrange the columns and 
rows of standard S-box in AES. Tests proved that the 
modified AES is more secure than the standard one 
due to its dynamic structure in addition to increasing 
its immunity to linear and differential cryptanalysis as 
shown by avalanche test results in table 12.  
 
Table 10. Average value of  avalanche tests for (plain 
text – Secret key) in AES and Modified AES. 
Input type of 
data 
Type of 
algorithm 
Avalanche average 
value 
Plaintext   Modified AES  50.15% 
Plaintext   AES  49.71% 
Secret key  Modified AES  49.86% 
Secret key  AES  49.84% 
 
(ii)   Execution time can be reduced as follows:  
The  implementation  of  the  modified 
authentication algorithm required more operation than 
the standard one due to the dynamic nature of its S-
box.  Using  the  PIC18F452  microcontroller,  the 
execution  time  of  the  modified  algorithm  can  be 
greatly  decreased  to  about  50.333  ms  (  instead  of 
500ms taken by the standard algorithm using IC card. 
[19] ).     
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